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ABSTRACT
In December 2014, General Motors closed its flagship Opel plant in Bochum after 52
years of operation following years of economic struggles in the industrial Ruhr-valley
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1. Introduction
In December 2014, General Motors closed its flagship Opel plant in Bochum
after 52 years of operation amidst years of a general economic downturn in the
industrial Ruhr-valley region of northwestern Germany, marking the first closure of
a major German automobile plant since 1945. This study seeks to examine the
primary underlying causes of the landmark closure, such as the insolvency of GMOpel and tense employer-employee relations compounded by unsatisfactory trade
union negotiations between GM-Opel, IG Metall (German Metalworkers’ Union), the
Bochum works council, and local shop stewards. Subsequent social and economic
reactions to the closure are also examined, including the yearlong “This is not Detroit”
campaign launched by local Bochum artists to inspire alternative uses for the site of
the plant after the closure.
Bochum lies in the economically-depressed Ruhrgebiet (Ruhr valley region),
and the Opel plant there was the primary source of employment for 3,500 locals,
though it employed up to 22,000 employees at its peak employment. The GM-Opel
brand has been steadily declining in European popularity in the past few decades, and
as a result they have scaled down their German operations significantly.
The Opel Bochum plant was scheduled to stop vehicle production there in
2016, which would mark the first time that a carmaker closed a plant in Germany in
decades. However, due to financial difficulties incurred by General Motors, the
timeline was misjudged and the plant was closed swiftly, producing its last Zafira
Tourer in late 2014. Only about 300 of the former 3,500 employees are expected to
remain employed by Opel in a parts operation; the others face an uncertain future.
5

During its operation, the Opel plant was the primary source of employment for
a large portion of Bochum’s population; this problem was only compounded as
another major employer in the area (a Nokia plant) was closed in 2008. The main
industrial employers that remain are the Ruhr University Bochum and those
businesses that are associated with it. This means that the city now faces significant
economic uncertainty, as workers are either struggling to find new employment
within a reasonable distance of their homes or relocating to find work while the
property of the former Opel Bochum plant waits to be redeveloped by new owners.
The original scope of this thesis was to draw parallels between these outcomes and
what happened because of the General Motors plant closure in Detroit, which
contributed to the formation of the “ghost town” of Detroit and its subsequent
financial hardships; however, the scope of the research quickly became too large to
manage, and so this thesis was then scaled down to offer an in-depth case study of the
historic closure to better understand the various factors surrounding the closure and
the implications thereof.

2. Background Information
2.1 Bochum and the Ruhrgebiet
Bochum is a relatively populous city that lies in the economically depressed
Ruhrgebiet, or Ruhr valley region, which is located within the state of North-Rhine
Westphalia in northwestern Germany. The Ruhr valley region and its administrative
divisions is highlighted in Fig. 1 below.
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Fig. 1: Vietor, Bierte, T. Hoppe, and Joy Clancy. “Siting of the Ruhr Valley region in
Germany and administrative divisions.” ResearchGate, 2016. Web. 2 Mar. 2017.

With an approximate population density of 2,800 persons/km 2 and a total
estimated population of 8.5 million people, the Ruhr valley region is currently the
largest urban area in Germany, and the third largest in the European Union
(Demographia).
The Ruhr-valley is historically known for its extensive mining and industrial
operations, which is why the region experienced a significant economic downtown in
the 1950s when the national German economy strayed from mining coal to focus on
oil and natural gas as their primary source of energy. Many cities in the Ruhr
experienced a significant economic collapse, and the last mine in Bochum was
officially closed in 1972 (Henning, “Germany: GM Opel”). Many former mine workers
and other industrial workers found themselves out of work, and many turned to large
local manufacturers such as Adam Opel AG for employment in their factories. Thus,
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these large manufacturers and their plants quickly became a major source of income
for the region, such as Opel and Nokia.
2.2 General Motors and Adam Opel AG in Europe
General Motors Company (GM) is an American multinational corporation with
headquarters in Detroit, Michigan. Founded originally in 1908 as the “General Motors
Corporation”, GM is typically recognized in the automotive industry for the cars they
manufacture, though they have also traded quite heavily in financial services as well.
GM was recognized as the largest automotive manufacturer from 1931 until 2005,
and again in 2011. GM produces vehicles around the world under twelve brands, one
of which is Adam Opel AG, which was under the control of General Motors Europe.
General Motors Europe (known as “GM Europe”, or simply “GME”) was a
subsidiary of GM established in 1986 and was responsible for all operations of GM
businesses in Europe. The primary GME brands were England-based Vauxhall and
Germany-based Opel. GME experienced significant financial difficulties in the
European market for many years, and the corporation declared bankruptcy in 2009.
GM Europe was officially declared defunct in 2010.
Adam Opel AG (typically known only as “Opel”) is headquartered in
Rüsselsheim in Hesse, Germany and was originally acquired by GM in 1929. Opel
manufactures mostly passenger and light commercial vehicles, as well as various
vehicle components for worldwide distribution within the GM Europe production
network. Opel traces its roots to a sewing machine manufacturer founded by Adam
Opel in 1862. This manufacturer then produced its first bicycle in 1886 which led to
its eventual start in the automobile manufacturing industry in 1899. Prior to World
8

War II, Adam Opel AG was recognized as the largest motor vehicle manufacturer in
Europe. Opel had several of its plants in Germany, and Opel Bochum was one of their
most productive plants.
It is also important to note a fundamental difference between Opel and other
notable contemporary automobile manufacturers, as this difference affected how
business operations were communicated within the company structure. Whereas
most of the recognizable auto manufacturers are either fully American (i.e. Ford) or
fully German (i.e. Volkswagen or BMW) owned and operated, Opel operates as a
German subsidiary, yet is owned by an American company (General Motors). This has
created some cultural disconnect in how changes in business operations are
communicated within the company structure, as fully American manufacturers
typically follow a top-down executive style of decision making, whereas fully German
manufacturers typically engage in traditional negotiations with local works councils
and trade unions to make decisions that will impact the workforce.
2.3 IG Metall and Trade Unions in Germany
Also

known

as

Industriegewerkschaft

Metall

(translated:

“German

Metalworkers’ Union”), IG Metall is the dominant metalworkers’ trade union in
Germany and is currently both Germany’s and Europe’s largest industrial union with
approximately 2.27 million members (Sackmann).
IG Metall is a member of the Germany Confederation of Trade Unions
(“Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund” or “DGB”) and experienced high membership
among the Opel Bochum plant workers and plant stewards (historically upwards of
80%) (Kirschbaum). Founded in 1949, the union represents workers from various
9

industries including mining, manufacturing and industrial production, machining,
printing, steel production, and modern automobile manufacturing, along with various
engineering and IT sectors.
In order to understand the collective political bargaining power that IG Metall
holds in Germany, it is important to note significant differences between trade unions
in the United States and Germany. Typically, trade unions are much stronger and
enjoy greater participation by employees in Germany than in the United States. While
American trade unions remain a political factor, union membership peaked in the
1950s in the United States and has been steadily declining as “right to work” laws are
being adopted by an increasing number of states. However, a good contemporary
American counterpart to IG Metall is the United Automobile Workers (UAW) union,
founded in the 1930s as part of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). It is
the most prominent union for automobile workers in the United States and currently
has over 400,000 active members in the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico (“Who
We Are”). However, the UAW cannot quite compare to the scale of IG Metall, which
represents the interests of 2.27 million members in Germany.
Furthermore, German unions are characterized by a much higher degree of
employee participation than those in the United States, up to and including codetermination on a company’s board of directors, where works councils and trade
union representatives sometimes receive full voting rights. Local works councils are
also established by companies, and members are democratically elected by
employees to represent their interests at a company level. These are often integral to
the framework for defining working conditions and negotiating collective wage
10

agreements, and the thoroughly legally-defined and multilayer structure of employee
participation in German trade unions has contributed to both their robustness and
longevity.

2.4 History of Opel in Bochum
After the mining crisis in the 1950s that shut down most of the Ruhr valley
region’s mining operations, Adam Opel AG quickly became the largest employer in
Bochum after the establishment of the Opel Bochum plant in 1962 (Grebing and
Hinse). The local economy restructured itself around Opel and other large industrial
employers, making the well-being of the local economy largely dependent on the
success of these employers (Badewitz).
The Opel Bochum plant was first opened on October 10th, 1962 with more than
9,000 of their planned 14,000 initial employees being guaranteed job security in their
plant (Zeitreise Bochum). After a few weeks, the Opel Bochum plant began producing
almost 1,000 Kadett automobiles daily from the assembly lines (Praschma). Three
“sites” within the plant were subsequently established: one in Bochum-Laer, and two
in nearby Bochum-Langendreer. Site I was responsible for the production of Opel’s
automobile models (including their initial “Kadett” model), and Site II was
responsible for producing engines and axles for the production network of GM
Europe, whereas Site III was chiefly a support warehouse that distributed parts to
Opel dealers worldwide. Opel participated in the local Bochum works council voting
for the first time in 1962, when 87.3% of the works council were also members of the
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IG Metall trade union. This indicates a longstanding effort by Opel to negotiate with
local trade unions to settle worker disputes (Grebing and Hinse).
Over its 52 years of continuous operation from 1962 to 2014, the Opel Bochum
plant produced over 14 million cars. At times, over 22,000 workers were employed
in the plant, and further tens of thousands of workers were employed in the region
through the service or delivery of Opel parts/vehicles. When Opel retired the Kadett
model in 1991, they had sold over 11 million Kadetts, 7.5 million of which had been
produced at the Bochum plant. The infographic shown below in Fig. 2 was released
by Die Welt in 2014 to show the varied lifespan of various Opel models that were
produced at the Opel Bochum plant, as well as the approximate number of workers
employed during the time of production of those models.

Fig. 2: “Opel in Bochum.” Infographic. Die Welt. WeltN24 GmbH, 2014.
Web. 5 Oct. 2015.
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The Opel Bochum plant reached a peak employment of over 20,000 employees
when the plant was producing the Ascona and Kadett/Olympia models in the 1970s.
For decades, Opel Bochum was GM Europe’s largest production facility and
still employed 19,200 employees both directly and indirectly in 1992, which was
reduced drastically to around 3,500 direct workers by the time of the plant closure
(Praschma). Over the course of its tenure, the Bochum plant was considered to be the
“heart of Opel” as it was the primary manufacturer of the Kadett, Astra, and Zafira
models (Einenkel). Their steadfastness led to their moniker of “Opel, der
Zuverlässige” or “Opel, the reliable” in Bochum (Praschma). An aerial view of the
plant’s property in Bochum-Laer is shown below in Fig. 3.

Fig. 3: Tuxyso. Aerial Shot of Production Location of Adam Opel AG, Site I in Bochum.
2014. Bochum. Wikimedia Commons, 2014. Web. 5 Oct. 2015.

After facing threats of closure for over 10 years, the last automobile rolled off
the assembly line at the Opel Bochum plant on December 5 th, 2014. The Opel Bochum
13

plant has since been listed in the Route of Industrial Culture (Theme Route: Bochum)
since March 2014, when much of the Ruhr valley began to advertise its industrial
culture in an effort to attract more tourism. By the end of June 2015, all of the property
was closed, and the dismantling of the Lackiererei (paint shop) had already begun.
The remaining buildings were symbolically sold to the “Bochum Perspective 2022”
society for reuse in the future, although the demolition of most the plant sites is
currently on hold, pending the outcome of litigation in the Düsseldorf Higher Regional
Court in March 2016. The complete demolition is expected to then take approximately
15 months to complete. The society is currently considering extending permanent
monument status to the Opel administrative building, although their decision is not
yet final, and they are also considering companies’ proposals to redevelop parts of the
68 hectares (680,000 square meters) that was once the Opel Bochum plant.

3. Underlying Causes Surrounding the Closure
3.1 GM/Opel Insolvency and Contributing Factors
While there were several contributing factors to the closure of the Opel
Bochum plant, the primary root of the problems stemmed from the financial
difficulties that GM experienced in the European car market, which were only further
compounded by the United States’ economic crisis in 2008. GM Europe had been
incurring losses since 1999, and GM Europe had made an estimated operating loss of
€2 billion between 1997 and 2004 (“Planned Job Cuts”). Unfortunately, General
Motors had been stuck for many years in a steady downward trend in Europe, forcing
it to find ways to reduce operations in order to avoid going further into debt, and at
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the time of the 2004 wildcat strike at the Bochum plant, workers at the Rüsselsheim
and Bochum plants had the highest average wages of any Opel plant workers, making
both plants prime targets for layoffs or closure (Blazejewski). Wildcat strikes in
Germany are relatively rare, as they are unsanctioned strikes that are undertaken by
unionized workers without the prior authorization of union leadership, and this
particular wildcat strike put the spotlight on the tensions between GM Europe, IG
Metall, and Opel Bochum plant workers, although this is discussed in a later section.
Despite promising to keep the production of the Astra and Zafira models
exclusively at Bochum until 2014 as stated in Opel’s European “Master Agreement”,
Opel moved production of the Astra to Rüsselsheim between 2006 and 2008, and the
chairman of the regional works council declared that “two Astra-plants in one country
just won’t work”. The Bochum works council chairman Rainer Einenkel was also
displeased and was quoted as saying, “we’re tired of being lied to… those who provide
shitty quality are the ones allowed to build the cars”, remarking on how GM had
broken its promise to Bochum by relocating the Astra model (Schaumberg). With this
new broken promise from GM, the Opel Bochum plant was once again on the list of
potential closures (Einenkel).
The effects of the United States automobile industry and economic crises of
2008 only compounded the financial difficulties that GM had been experiencing in
Europe. The collapse of the “too big to fail” banks in the United States included the
financial collapse of the financing company run by General Motors (formerly GMAC,
now known as “Ally Financial”) (Amadeo). Furthermore, GM had already experienced
a significant drop in sales in their most popular and profitable models (SUVs and
15

pickup trucks) due to the rising fuel prices from the earlier global energy crisis of
2003-2008, as these models typically suffer from poor fuel economy and were
subsequently hit the hardest in sales during the resulting automobile industry crisis.
Although the 2008 financial crisis originated in the United States, it quickly developed
into a global financial crisis because of the widespread effects of the collapse of
several international financial institutions and led to what came to be known as the
global “Great Recession” in the years that followed. While the GM headquarters
focused on trying to manage and recover from the financial crisis in the United States,
GM Europe felt particular pressure in trying to minimize losses in Europe so as not to
intensify the financial pressures GM was already facing.
However, GM Europe declared bankruptcy in 2009, and German regional and
state governments rallied together to give Opel a bailout credit of €1.5 billion. Shortly
thereafter on June 1st, 2009, the GM headquarters declared insolvency, whereupon
the United States government effectively nationalized GM through a bailout of $51
billion to GM and an additional $17.2 billion to GMAC to avoid the total collapse of GM
and the loss of millions of U.S. jobs (Amadeo). To combat their bankruptcy and to
accelerate their return to profitability, GM eliminated over 35,000 jobs worldwide
and closed 17 plants in the US alone. Initially, GM sought to sell off Opel, but retracted
this strategy in November and proceeded to pay back all loans to the German
government (Einenkel). Despite these changes, GM and other multinational
companies across the globe were still struggling to recover from the global economic
downturn that occurred as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. The global economic
downturn made it much more difficult for GM to bounce back, as it further hurt GM
16

sales and operations across the globe. Additionally, the European debt crisis that
began to develop in 2009 and 2010 also fueled the economic instability of Europe,
which also intensified general economic problems in the European market.
Between 2007 and 2011, the Opel plants in Portugal, Belgium, England, and
Sweden were closed or sold. In 2011 and 2012, General Motors was still in debt, and
so the European Works Council decided to make political maneuvers in order to save
other plant locations at the expense of closing the Bochum plant (Einenkel).
These financial difficulties are partly a result of GM’s falling popularity with
the European market, as their brand image had already been damaged over the years
due to a variety of influences, including plant closures across Europe as well as a
cultural disconnect in how the firm dealt with local trade unions and works councils.
Another popular claim is that the model selection offered by GM Europe followed
American tastes and thus did not sell as well in Europe. In a case study conducted
about how GM and the other “Big 3” U.S. carmakers (Ford and Chrysler) lost their hold
on the American car market, the author mentioned that one of GM’s fundamental
problems in their global marketing strategy is that it prioritized industrial size in
seeking to create “a car for every purse and purpose” and to be “all things to all
people” instead of specializing in a single type of automobile as other car
manufacturers often do (Maynard). The GM headquarters in Detroit and GM Europe
were constantly struggling to determine the “right” branding strategy for the
European market, and the failure of GM to tailor its product exclusively for the
European market only contributed to the downward spiral of their sales in Europe.

17

Another popular claim is that the GM headquarters and GM Europe were
constantly arguing over the proper calculation of profits and losses in the European
branch. Some claimed that the reported losses of the GM Europe operations are
mostly due to an inherently unfair accounting system and GM’s internal transfer
pricing policy, although that is a separate discussion. Regardless, this long-standing
quarrel combined with the untailored branding strategy greatly affected how the
brand was perceived in Europe. In a 2004 article, analysists said that GM had “no
choice but to reduce its head count in Europe sharply, because… their image is so bad
that they can’t sell their cars” (Landler, “Resentment Towards GM Grows”). Arndt
Ellinhorst, an analyst at Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein in Frankfurt summed up the
problem by stating, “[GM] really misread the market” (Landler, “Resentment Towards
GM Grows”).
There was also significant censure of the GM management style, as there was
a distinct cultural disconnect when and how GM chose to announce the downsizing
measures and eventual closure of the Bochum plant to the community and to its
employees. Most significantly, the executives of General Motors chose to bypass and
completely disregard the traditional German custom of initially negotiating
downsizing measures with the local trade union (here, IG Metall) behind closed doors.
Instead, General Motors relied on its American-style of management, which
effectively announced cutbacks directly to the media and its employees without first
negotiating measures with the workers’ trade union in the interest of promoting
“transparency” in its decision-making process. In regards to this, Tony Cervone, a
spokesman for GM Europe, stated “We pledge to speak to our employees first” and
18

that their handling of this situation was “based on a corporate culture that transcends
national boundaries” (Landler, “Resentment Towards GM Grows”). The lack of regard
for this time-honored German custom of trade union negotiations resulted in a largescale strike of workers who walked out of Bochum’s Opel plant for nearly a week in
2004. They barricaded access to the plant, and the strike ultimately brought Opel
operations in Europe to a halt, as the Bochum Opel plant was the supplier of many
parts used at other European Opel plants. The political backlash against General
Motors for their American-style labor-management relations further sent the
demand for their vehicles into decline in an already shrinking European car market.
The company’s failure to tailor its product and its management to European styles is
part of the reason that the GM brands are continuing to decline in prominence in
Western Europe.
Similar carmakers such as Volkswagen have avoided this fate by addressing
concerns directly through the local trade unions. In 2004, Volkswagen averted a fullscale strike by offering factory workers a seven-year job guarantee in return for a 28month freeze in wages (Landler, “Volkswagen Averts Strike”). This deal was reached
after a typical German bargaining marathon between company executives and the
trade union; the goal was to reduce labor costs of the plant while maintaining labor
harmony. The failure to maintain this harmony between the plant workers and GM
management stoked the flames of dissent and was ultimately the death knell of the
Bochum branch of Opel operations. Immediately following the end of the 2004
wildcat strike on October 20th, 2004, Stern magazine published the following
magazine cover, shown below in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4: Methode Wild-West (“Wild West Methods”). 2004. Magazine cover. Stern
magazine, Oct. 2004. Web. 5 Oct. 2015.

Stern magazine is a weekly German news magazine that traditionally has
published a leftist stance. In the accompanying article with this cover, Stern describes
GM as the “brand killer from Detroit” that used “wild west” methods, suggesting that
the anger at the newly announced GM cutbacks in Europe had taken on a distinctly
anti-American flavor (Landler, “Resentment Towards GM Grows”). Many of those
affected felt that the GM management was extorting its European workforce by
threatening to move production to cheaper countries, and this perception further
hurt GM’s brand image in the European market (Henning, “Germany: GM Opel”).
Additionally, overcapacity at European plants has become a common issue for
many automobile manufacturers, as demand has fallen sharply in past years, although
high volume automobile manufacturers such as Opel and Peugeot have suffered the
20

backlash the most (Ewing). Other car manufacturers such as DaimlerChrysler and
Volkswagen have dealt with falling profits by negotiating with the trade unions to
provide smaller wage increases and other concessions while avoiding the relocation
of production to cheaper countries. They made these concessions to avoid causing
massive layoffs of European workers, which historically damage the brand image of
companies within the European market (Landler, “Resentment Towards GM Grows”).
Despite these setbacks, GM was able to recover enough financially through
nationalization to be able to deploy large sums of money to implement “socially
peaceful” downsizing in Europe in order to pursue more lucrative global markets
outside of Europe (Schaumberg). These “socially peaceful” measures included large
compensation packages to workers in exchange for voluntary layoffs at many plants,
although these packages were not necessarily greeted with enthusiasm at most plants
that faced closure.

3.2 Strike in 2004 at Opel-Bochum Plant
On October 14th, 2004, GM Europe announced a corporate restructuring plan
with extensive job cuts, to the tune of 12,000 jobs in Europe, without prior
consultation with union representatives. The GM chairman, Rick Wagoner, purposely
did not exclude the possibility of a complete shutdown of a major European plant as
part of this corporate restructuring plan (Blazejewski). As the Bochum plant
employed approximately 10,000 workers at the time, Bochum workers were
especially worried about layoffs and a factory closure, as GM had previously
announced its intentions to move vehicle production to lower-cost sites in Eastern
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Europe (Landler, “Impact of Opel Strike”). Like other cities in the Ruhr, Bochum had
already experienced a heavy loss of industry, and the Opel plant was one of the few
major employers left besides the Nokia plant and the Ruhr University Bochum.
Although the Rüsselsheim plant chose to initiate negotiations between work councils
and the GM management, the Bochum workers staged an illegal wildcat strike out of
desperation to preserve their jobs. This is significant, as both German plants were
under scrutiny for having the highest average wages at the time (Blazejewski), and
thus were a source of potential cost savings for GM Europe.
The Bochum plant’s radical approach to labor-management relations was
likely inspired by a previous strike in Rheinhausen in 1987, when workers staged a
160-day wildcat strike that involved over 100,000 people to protest the closure of a
Krupp steel production plant. Although their actions only delayed the closure of the
plant until 1993, the Rheinhausen strike became a symbol of solidarity and worker
democracy in the region, and many former steelworkers from this plant later joined
the Bochum Opel plant workforce (Blazejewski).
However, the choice to strike appeared to lead to a bigger controversy over
the “preferred” conflict strategy of negotiations, rather than ignite discussion on the
original issue of corporate restructuring. Traditionally, companies open negotiations
with the local works council and IG Metall representatives to reconcile differences;
however, shop stewards at the Bochum plant sought open confrontation to induce
radical change. This approach probably stemmed in part from frustrations over past
negotiations that had failed, as Bochum had lost 10,000 jobs in negotiations between
1992 and 2004, despite substantial worker concessions (Blazejewski).
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The vast disconnect between the motives of local shop stewards and the
official IG Metall functionaries also partially led to this controversial wildcat strike.
Shop stewards are unique in that their role in German labor law is not fully defined,
and they are therefore “unrestrained” by traditional labor law as the local works
council and union representatives are. Although the shop stewards at the Bochum
plant were necessarily members of IG Metall, their motive in continuing the wildcat
strike was primarily to protect the jobs and income of their colleagues and the local
plant, whereas IG Metall union officers at the time sought to preserve their own
personal power and the union’s already tenuous role as a central player in the
German industrial bargaining system, often at the expense of individual plants
(Blazejewski).
Thus, IG Metall and the local works council for Bochum both opposed the
walkout, and on October 17th, 2004, the vice-chairman of IG Metall, Bertold Huber,
publicly denounced the walkout as illegal. By speaking out against their own
constituents in the Bochum plant, IG Metall sought to preserve their legitimacy as a
labor union, as wildcat strikes are considered illegal under trade union law in Europe.
A GM spokesperson downplayed the significance of the strike, saying that “with a
couple more days of perspective, I think they’ll approach [the situation] differently”,
whereas the head of the Bochum chapter of IG Metall said it wasn’t “a matter of time,
but a matter of what’s the offer [from the company]” with regards to the duration of
the strike, although they did not endorse their local workers’ actions (Landler,
“Impact of Opel Strike”).
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The wildcat strike in Bochum lasted for a total of six days. Four days into the
strike, operations in three other key Opel plants in Europe were forced to halt after a
parts shortage that resulted from this wildcat strike. This parts shortage was due to
the Bochum plant’s central position in GM Europe’s production network, and as such,
the three sites of the Bochum Opel plant had varying levels of involvement in the
wildcat strike. Site I, which produced the Zafira and Astra models at the time, was
located 5km away from the other two sites and was somewhat disconnected from the
strike. Site II, which produced axles and gearboxes for the GM Europe production
network, was primarily responsible for the production halt at Opel plants in Germany,
Belgium, and the UK during the strike. Site III mainly acted as a support unit which
supplied parts to Opel dealers worldwide. Workers from Site II and Site III were the
primary instigators of the strike as they felt they had the “least to lose” (Blazejewski).
On October 19th, a European “day of action” was organized to legitimize the
unofficial strike as well as to allow IG Metall and the local works council to re-channel
the strike activities and regain control of the strike narrative. The rally in Bochum
was dominated by IG Metall banners, and none of the speakers at the rally were the
local shop stewards (Blazejewski). On October 20th, the wildcat strike in Bochum
ended after the results of a ballot were released, which indicated workers’ desires to
end the strike. However, it is important to note that much speculation surrounds the
legitimacy of this ballot, as the original question on the ballot was re-formulated from
a simple question of whether or not the strike should continue to a two-part question
that allowed only one answer. The re-formulated question read “Should the works
council continue negotiations with management and should work be resumed? Yes
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or no”, which excluded a crucial alternative of both continuing negotiations with
management and continuing the strike. This manipulation of the ballot forced
workers into an either/or situation, to which only 70% of workers replied “yes”. The
questionable legitimacy of this ballot further strained relations between the local
works council, shop stewards, and local workers, although the identity of the entity
who changed the wording of the ballot remains unknown (Blazejewski).
Overall, GM was wholly unprepared to deal with this grass-root action in
Bochum and was ultimately forced to compromise to the tune of €1 billion in
compensation to the Bochum plant, further straining relations between the Bochum
plant and GME (Blazejewski). Lingering frustrations and resentments on both sides
of this conflict could very likely have been a contributing factor to GM Europe’s choice
of closing the more lucrative Bochum plant as opposed to other European Opel plants.

4. Reactions to Closure
On December 5th, 2014, the last Zafira rolled off Opel’s production line in
Bochum (The Associated Press and “In Bochum Rollt”), officially making Opel the first
automobile maker to shutter a German plant in decades (Hetzner). The Opel Bochum
plant workers, IG Metall, and the local Bochum and Ruhr communities all reacted to
the closure in various ways.

4.1 Opel Bochum Workers
The initial reaction to the closure was a sense of betrayal. Two years before
the closure, in December 2012, the Opel board of directors’ director, Sedran, was
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criticized for arriving with over 70 guards in Bochum to announce that the “closure
of Opel [in Bochum] is necessary for the rescue of Opel”, after which he promptly
disappeared 7 minutes later. Local newspapers described his actions as “poor” and
“cowardly” (Einenkel). Even Knut Giesler, who served on the regional IG Metall
chapter, said that “an executive who tells workers that manufacturing will come to an
end, only to then avoid a discussion by leaving through the emergency exit leaves a
devastating impression behind him” (Hetzner).
In the same month, workers were disgruntled when the 50th anniversary
celebration of the Opel Bochum plant was cancelled by the same board of directors,
as they decided that “Für Bochum geben wir kein Geld mehr aus!”, or simply “We are
not spending any more money on Bochum!” (Einenkel). In January 2013, the IG Metall
committee confirmed the end of car production at Bochum. At this time,
approximately 87% of Opel Bochum plant workers were members of IG Metall, and
survey results from the time showed they were incredibly disappointed and shocked
by the decision from the other Opel locations to essentially abandon the Opel Bochum
plant. Two months later, March 3rd was declared the “Day of Solidarity”, and Bochum
experienced over 20,000 visitors. It was the biggest solidarity event up until that
point in history in the Ruhr valley region (Einenkel). Many local artists participated
and created art that represented the solidarity action they meant to support, such as
the painting by local Bochum artist Bernd Röttgers in Fig. 5 below.
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Fig. 5: Röttgers, Bernd. Wir Bleiben Bochum (“We’re staying Bochum“). 2013.
Bochum Solidaritätsfest. Painting. www.wir-gemeinsam.eu. Web. 17 Mar. 2016.

In his artwork, Röttgers captured both old and new Opel models and showed
the integration of various Bochum landmarks alongside the Opel Bochum plant. He
also used the Opel logo in the word “Bochum” to show the cultural significance of Opel
in Bochum.
In September 2013, workers at the Opel Bochum plant arranged a 17-hour
long employee meeting, which turned out to be the longest meeting in the history of
Opel. They discussed many topics, one of which was the possibility of striking,
although this did not occur. On December 5th, 2014, car production in Bochum ended
abruptly, and 3,500 people immediately lost their jobs. Approximately 2,700
employees were sent to a “transfer company”, which is essentially a realm of waiting
for further employment while collecting unemployment benefits (Einenkel).
On December 15th, 2014, the last employee meeting was held at the Opel
Bochum plant, with around 2,700 employees attending. Not a single member of the
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board of directors or IG Metall union representatives were present, much to the
workers’ disappointment. For their absence, Opel Bochum workforce and local media
condemned Opel and IG Metall as “erbärmlich, unwürdig, und feige” (“envious,
unworthy, and cowardly”) (Einenkel). The remaining employees in the transfer
company continue to wait on future employment as promised by IG Metall and Opel
as part of the plant closure.

4.2 IG Metall (German Metalworkers’ Union)
After the closure of the Bochum plant was announced in 2012, the head of IG
Metall’s regional NRW chapter said he would continue to fight for manufacturing jobs
in Bochum after 2016 —the original proposed date of the Opel Bochum closure—
because “[IG Metall’s] goal is clear – no one should see the unemployment agency
from the inside” (Hetzner).
However, after the disappointing outcomes of the 2000 and 2004 strikes in
Bochum, there was little faith by the workers that IG Metall would mount a tough
opposition to GM in response to the closure. No attempts were made to support a
“national boycott action against Opel” or to host solidarity strikes in all factories,
despite the demands from the disgruntled workforce. IG Metall and local works
councils chose instead to focus on making sure Opel would “regain growth and
profitability” (Schaumberg). Essentially, IG Metall sought to preserve their own
regional bargaining power, even at the expense of renouncing actions of their own
constituents in the Opel Bochum plant and eventually offering up the Opel Bochum
plant for closure to appease GM management.
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Longstanding criticism of their methods remain strong, with some socialist
opponents labelling IG Metall as a “relic of the past”, insinuating that the trade unions
“have become corporate co-managers, which organize job destruction and wage cuts
and ensure that all opposition to these processes is suppressed in the factories”
(Henning, “Germany: GM Opel”). However, sacrificing one location to preserve others
is not unheard of in German trade union negotiations, especially when politics
become involved, and IG Metall continues to bargain on the behalf of the remaining
20,800 Opel Germany employees (Hetzner).

4.3 Local Bochum and Ruhr community
For many Bochum locals, the loss of the Opel Bochum plant marked the loss of
their identity, as Opel was integral to the cultural history of Bochum. The popular
singer Herbert Grönemeyer aptly expressed this sentiment by stating that “Bochum
is Opel and Opel is Bochum!” (“Das Detroit-Projekt”). Many locals even identified
themselves as “Opelaners”, as supported by this photograph taken in 2014 in
Bochum, shown below in Fig. 6.

29

Fig. 6: Wir Waren Opelaner mit Herz und Seele (“We were Opelaners with heart and
soul“). 2014. Bochum. Photograph. Bochum Marketing GmbH, 2015. Web. 5 Oct 2015.

Local newspapers lamented that “Opel hat sein Herz und seine Seele verloren”
(“Opel has lost its heart and soul”) with the closure of the Opel Bochum plant
(Einenkel). Over 20,000 people were directly and indirectly affected by the closure,
which plunged Bochum into further deindustrialization (Praschma).
To combat the loss of identity that many Bochum locals felt as a result of the
closure, local Bochum artists and artists from three other Opel plants in Poland, Great
Britain, and Spain came together to create a yearlong art project “We are not Detroit”
with the Bochum Schauspielhaus and Urban Art Ruhr group. This initiative began on
October 10th, 2013 —symbolic of the day that the Opel Bochum plant was founded—
and continued until October 2014. The cover of the official festival program released
for the main festival that took place from April 26th to July 5th, 2014, is shown below
in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 7: Schauspielhaus Bochum. Das Festivalprogramm von dem Detroit Projekt (“The
Festival Program from the Detroit Project”). 2014. Bochum. Festival program cover.
www.schauspielhausbochum.de. Web. 17 Mar. 2016.

The primary focus of ‘The Detroit Project’ was aimed at encouraging locals to
become “actors instead of victims of industrial change”, and thereby focused the
project on regaining the lost identity of Bochum locals (“Das Detroit-Projekt”).
Thus, the project did not aim to support Opel workers who were losing their
jobs or “involve itself in a discussion intrinsically about Opel”, but rather to ask the
question “What alternatives exist for the company’s sites, moving forward?” (Fuchs).
When faced with the same deindustrialization that bankrupted the city of Detroit —
the home of GM’s international headquarters— these Bochum artists used this art
project to inspire alternative uses for the abandoned Opel Bochum plant sites.
Meanwhile, the local city council of Bochum worked with Opel to transfer ownership
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of the Opel property to the “Bochum Perspective 2022” society in July 2015. This
society was tasked with determining the fate of the 68 hectares of the former Opel
Bochum plant property (Einenkel).

5. Implications for the Future of Bochum
One year after the closure, the Opel Bochum plant is in ruins, and there are no
new Opel jobs in sight as had been previously promised by IG Metall and GM Opel
during the closure negotiations (Henning, “Opel Bochum”). In December 2015,
approximately 2,700 of the remaining 3,500 workers from the Opel Bochum plant
were placed temporarily in a transfer company. Trade unions have historically used
these transfer companies to promise alternative jobs to prevent widespread
resistance to mass layoffs in the industry. These transfer companies then try to
retrain employees and place them back into the workforce at other plants, although
the success has been limited in the case of the Opel Bochum plant. The majority of the
remaining Opel Bochum workers were moved into the TÜV Nord Bildung [Education]
GmbH, a two-year transfer company. However, 750 of them are over 55 years old and
are part of an early retirement program. This means that most of the workers will
take early retirement, the cost of which is a pension reduction of approximately 3.6%
for every year they retire in advance of their normal pension age (Henning, “Opel
Bochum”). Of the 2,700 employees moved into this transfer company, it is estimated
that only 100 of those had found new employment as of December 2015 (Henning,
“Opel Bochum”).
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It is important to note some key differences in the generosity of
unemployment benefits in the US as opposed to Germany. Although it still depends
on a variety of factors such as length of previous employment and age, German
unemployment benefits include 60-67% of their previous net earnings for up to the
first year of unemployment. When this runs out, the unemployed workers may then
be eligible to claim an ongoing subsistence allowance through the “Hartz IV” reforms
program if they are still fit to work and ready to step into any available job offered to
them by the local employment office, or “Arbeitsamt”, although eligibility is limited
by a number of factors (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Henkel). Comparatively,
companies in the United States typically compensate unemployed workers for 4050% of the worker’s previous earnings for up to 26 weeks (one half-year), although
this varies greatly by state (Dishman). Thus, while short-term unemployment for
German workers is not ideal, workers can adjust to a reduced unemployment income
temporarily as long as new employment can be found within that first year. The
troubling trend in this situation is that many former Opel Bochum workers are still
unable to find employment after an entire year with the TÜV Nord Bildung
[Education] GmbH transfer company, sparking concerns about long-term
unemployment in the absence of new industrial jobs.
The initial closure of the plant caused a spike in unemployment in Bochum,
and many locals who were indirectly affected by the closure (typically those who
worked in associated industries that serviced or delivered Opel automobiles and
parts) had to seek other jobs in surrounding cities, which increased worker
commutes and forced some to relocate altogether. The relatively recent closure of the
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Nokia plant in Bochum in 2008 only compounded the effect of the Opel Bochum
closure, as approximately 2,300 Nokia workers had already been placed in a
temporary transfer company by IG Metall as part of the closure settlement of the
Nokia plant (Henning, “Opel Bochum”). However, whereas the Nokia plant only
employed approximately 4,000 workers at their height of their production, the Opel
Bochum plant had operated for much longer and had employed over 20,000 workers
at their height of their production (Ewing). Thus, the loss of the plant was felt both
economically and culturally by Bochum locals.
Meanwhile, the production of the Zafira model was moved to Opel’s
headquarters in Rüsselsheim, and the demolition has begun on the sprawling plant
buildings on the former Opel Bochum plant’s premises. Opel has kept a residual staff
in Bochum to conduct administrative business, and Opel plans to keep its distribution
center in Bochum-Langendreer, which currently employs around 700 locals. Opel
hopes to invest €60 million in a new warehouse at this location in the future
(Henning, “Opel Bochum”).
Following the closure, the land was symbolically sold to the “Bochum
Perspective 2022” society, with the city council and Opel having 51% and 49%
shareholding rights, respectively. This society is working to negotiate with companies
to bring some business back to the region by redeveloping the land, although thus far,
they have offered no substitutes for the well-paying industrial jobs lost in the plant
closure (Henning, “Opel Bochum”). Furthermore, before the land is redeveloped for
use by other companies, the city has to locate and fill old mine shafts and remedy
mining damage that is present on the property, as they mined coal in the area as early
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as 1742 (Toben). Some of the demolition work on the sites is also currently halted
pending the outcome of a court case in the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court that is
scheduled to end in March 2016. An estimated 15 months of demolition is expected
to follow before the land is safe to redevelop for alternative uses (Henning, “Opel
Bochum”). The demolition of the paint shop at the Opel Bochum Site I began shortly
after the plant closed, although progress is slow, as shown in this photograph taken
from Wittener Straße at the end of March in 2015.

Fig. 8: Cschirp. Abriss der Lackiererei des Opel Werks I in Bochum, Ende März 2015
von der Wittener Straße aus gesehen. 2015. Bochum. Photograph. Wikimedia
Commons. Web. 17 Mar. 2016.

Currently, approximately 14 hectares of the property have been sold to
Deutsche Post DHL Group. DHL is currently the world’s largest courier company and
plans to build a massive package distribution center on the premises (Toben).
Construction is expected to officially start in the summer of 2017, and the finished
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distribution center hopes to employ approximately 600 people at full working
capacity. The final sorting capacity of the constructed plant is expected to reach
somewhere in the range of 50,000 packages per hour, which would make it one of the
most powerful courier distribution centers in Germany (Weeke). Unfortunately,
although the redevelopment of a portion of the 68 hectares of the Opel Bochum plant
property will bring jobs back to the area, jobs in the logistics sector tend to be much
lower-paying and less secure than jobs in the production and processing sector
(Henning, “Opel Bochum”). Thus, these logistics jobs cannot be expected to fully
replace the income of those who lost their production jobs at the Opel Bochum plant.
In December 2015, Bochum had an unemployment rate of 9.5%, although many locals
hope that this statistic will decrease with the redevelopment of the plant property.
Although future GM-closures in Europe are still expected to happen if the
downward trend in demand for GM vehicles continues, GM faces further damage to
their brand image in the European market if they choose to outsource production for
cost savings or political gain. In 2015 General Motors has pledged that workers at
three other German Opel plants would not face any layoffs through 2018 (The
Associated Press). This was a positive outlook; however, General Motors recently
announced the sale of Opel and Vauxhall to Groupe PSA on March 6, 2017 for €2.2
billion. Groupe PSA is a French automobile manufacturer that currently owns the
brands Peugeot and Citroën, and spokesmen for the company say they are confident
that they can engineer a positive turnaround to Opel’s past performance in the
marketplace (DeBord).
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6. Conclusion
Throughout its 52 years of operation, the GM-Opel Bochum plant experienced
remarkable successes and hardships. After the economic crisis over the transition
from coal mining to oil and natural gas in the Ruhr valley region in the 1950s, the
establishment of the GM-Opel Bochum plant gave former mineworkers new, secure
jobs in the production and processing of automobiles and automobile parts. Beyond
the plant itself, thousands of locals were also employed indirectly with the service
and distribution of these automobiles and parts, and thus the GM-Opel plant in
Bochum represented a substantial economic force in the region. For decades, the Opel
Bochum plant was one of the most productive and lucrative plants in Opel’s portfolio
but was constantly under pressure by GM to reduce labor and operating costs.
In the years that followed the largely unsuccessful wildcat strike at the plant
in 2004, the Opel Bochum plant was constantly threatened with closure, as the
damaged GM brand image contributed to GM’s growing losses in the European car
market. After several broken promises, GM closed the Bochum plant rather abruptly
in December 2014, leavings thousands of workers unemployed without offers of
actual alternative jobs. The land on which the plant ruins now sit is currently owned
by the “Bochum Perspective 2022” society, which will work with the city council and
Opel representatives to seek out new companies to redevelop the land and bring
industrial employment back to the region. The future of Opel in Germany overall is
currently uncertain, as General Motors recently announced the sale of Opel to Groupe
PSA, which currently owns the Peugeot and Citroën brands, but industry experts
remain optimistic that Groupe PSA can turnaround some of Opel’s past losses.
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